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Abstract:
Preoccupied with sovereign control of access to their terri-
tories, states are devoting increasing energy and resources
to intercepting and turning back migrants before they ar-
rive at their borders. Interception measures, however,
rarely include adequate procedures to distinguish those
who need protection from those who do not. As a result,
desperate people are left with no option but to resort to
ever more dangerous and disruptive methods of migration.
This article surveys the main types of interception meas-
ures and their effects, and examines the international refu-
gee and human rights law issues raised by these practices.
It then reviews recent developments at the level of
UNHCR’s Executive Committee with regard to intercep-
tion and concludes with some suggestions for building
compliance with principles of refugee protection in the
context of interception measures.
Résumé
Soucieux de pouvoir contrôler complètement l’accès à
leur territoire, les états consacrent de plus en plus de res-
sources et d’efforts à intercepter et à renvoyer les migrants
avant même que ces derniers n’atteignent leurs frontières.
Dans la réalité, cependant, il est très rare que les mesures
d’interception comportent des procédures adéquates pour
départager ceux qui ont un besoin réel de protection des
autres. Il en résulte que les gens désespérés n’ont d’autre
choix que d’avoir recours à des méthodes de migration
qui sont de plus en plus dangereuses et disruptives.
Cet article examine les principales mesures d’interception
et leur efficacité, et se penche sur les problèmes soulevés
par ces pratiques au niveau du droit humain internatio-
nal et du droit d’asile. Il examine ensuite les derniers dé-
veloppements intervenus au Comité exécutif de la HCR
sur la question de l’interception, et conclut avec des sug-
gestions visant à encourager la mise en conformité des
mesures d’interception avec les principes de la protection
des réfugiés.
Introduction
Many States  which  have the  ability to do so find  that
intercepting migrants before they reach their territories is
one of the most effective measures to enforce their domestic
migration laws and policies.
International Organization for Migration, 20011
T
he blandness of this observation masks the serious-
ness of the assault on the institution of asylum posed
by interception practices. Concerned about sover-
eign control of access to their territories in an age of preoc-
cupation with national security, “irregular” migration, and the
so-called asylum-migration nexus, states are devoting more
andmoreenergyandresourcestoturningbackmigrantsbefore
they arrive at their borders. States regard these programs as
defences against the subversion of orderly immigration and
refugee resettlement programs by “bogus” refugees and
“queue-jumpers.”  However, in  practice these interception
measures leave desperate people with no option but to resort

to ever more dangerous and disruptive methods of migra-
tion and ultimately erode the institution of asylum.
Existing interception measures rarely include adequate
procedures to distinguish those who need protection from
those who do not. Unless current practices are either aban-
doned by states – which is unlikely – or are reformed to
conform to human rights law and refugee protection
norms, access to asylum will progressively be choked off.
Some refugees may reach asylum in a country neighbouring
their own or within their region of origin, but those oppor-
tunities may also dwindle, as countries of first asylum see
the industrialized states actively erecting barriers to prevent
asylum seekers from reaching their territories.
This article will look at the main types of interception
measures and their effects, and will examine the interna-
tional refugee and human rights law issues raised by these
practices.2 It will then review recent developments at the
level of the Executive Committee of the United Nations
High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) with regard to
interception and conclude with some suggestions for build-
ing compliance with principles of refugee protection in the
context of interception measures.
Definition of Interception
There is no generally accepted definition of intercep-
tion.3 A provisional definition was proposed by UNHCR in
a June 2000 report:
[I]nterception is defined as encompassing all measures applied
by a State, outside its national territory, in order to prevent,
interrupt or stop the movement of persons without the required
documentation crossing international borders by land, air or
sea, and making their way to the country of prospective desti-
nation.4
This definition applies equally to actions taken on land
or at sea. For the purposes of this paper, it will not be
considered to extend to passive measures such as visa re-
quirements, which are the most common form of migra-
tion control, or the carrier sanctions which buttress visa
requirements, but rather will be limited to active interven-
tion by states to impede the movement of persons.
Indeed, UNHCR’s Executive Committee has  recently
construed interception in this narrower, active sense, as:
…one of the measures employed by States to:
(i) prevent embarkation of persons on an international
journey;
(ii) prevent further onward international travel by persons
who have commenced their journey; or
(iii) assert control of vessels where there are reasonable
grounds to believe the vessel is transporting persons
contrary to international or national maritime law;
where, in relation to the above, the person or persons do not
have the required documentation or valid permission to en-
ter…5
The following case studies illustrate the types of issues
involved in interception:
Case Study No. 1
Mr. K., an Iranian writer, used false documents to flee Iran
hoping to reach Canada, where his brother is a citizen.6 He
travelled by air, via Moscow and Havana. At the airport in
Havana, while transferring to the final leg of his journey, his
fraudulent documents were discovered and he was refused
permission to board his flight to Canada. Cuba is not a party
to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
(1951 Refugee Convention)7 and did not give Mr. K. an
opportunity to claim asylum there, but put him on a plane
back to Moscow.
Before being sent back to Moscow Mr. K. was able to
telephone his brother in Canada, who alerted UNHCR in
Ottawa to his plight. UNHCR contacted their colleagues in
Moscow, to make sure that Mr. K. was not refouled to Iran
and was able to seek asylum in Russia, which is a party to
the 1951 Refugee Convention (albeit with significant short-
comings). Despite numerous requests, however, UNHCR
staff were denied access to Mr. K., who was detained at
Moscow’s International Airport. UNHCR’s office in Mos-
cow engaged a lawyer for Mr. K., who presented an asylum
application to the Russian authorities on his behalf. Never-
theless, Mr. K. was refouled to Tehran where, according to
his brother, he was detained on arrival.
Case Study No. 2
On August 26, 2001, the Tampa, a Norwegian freighter,
rescued 430 people from a sinking Indonesian ferry.8 The
passengers, mostly Afghans, asked to be taken to Christmas
Island, Australia, to seek asylum. When the Tampa sought
permission to dock at Christmas Island, it was refused by the
Government of Australia, which insisted that Norway or
Indonesia should take responsibility for the asylum seekers.
Neither of those governments, however, accepted responsi-
bility. When the Tampa entered Australian waters, Australia
deployed troops to prevent the ship from reaching land,
forcing it back outside of Australia’s territorial sea.9 The
master of the Tampa requested help, as some of the migrants
were in need of medical care. Yet the Australian government
would not allow the asylum seekers to enter its territory.
There was a stalemate.
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On September 1, Australia announced that it had found
a “solution”: Australia would pay the government of
Nauru, a tiny Pacific island and former Australian depend-
ent territory, an initial sum of US$10 million in aid in
exchange for Nauru’s agreement to house the asylum seek-
ers while their claims were being processed. UNHCR would
assess the claims of the asylum seekers on Nauru. Austra-
lia’s “Pacific Solution” was born.
Case Study No. 3
S., an Iraqi widow, was smuggled out of Iraq in the autumn
of 2002 together with R., her nine-year-old daughter.10 The
pair were brought to Iran through the marshlands of south-
ern Iraq. They remained in Iran for two months, while a
smuggler arranged forged passports of a European country
for them. In late 2002, the smuggler took them to Tehran’s
Mehrabad Airport and flew with them to Dubai. At Dubai
airport, they were to board a flight to Canada, where S. was
to be met by a man she had married by proxy. Before they
reached the passport control area at Dubai airport, S. was
told by the smuggler to pose as his wife. R., the child, was
instructed to walk ahead of the pair and not to look back or
call out to them. She passed through the exit control, but S.
and the smuggler were stopped. They were held at Dubai
airport for two days, where they were questioned separately
by the authorities. The United Arab Emirates are not Party
to the 1951 Refugee Convention. S. admitted that she was
attempting to reach Canada with the help of a smuggler and
a false passport, and was sent back to Iran. There, she was
detained at the airport for five days, before being bailed out
by someone whose assistance had been arranged by the man
in Canada whom S. had married by proxy. The Iranian
authorities gave her ninety days to leave Iran.
Meanwhile, the child, R., reached Canada, applied for
asylum, and was recognized as a refugee by Canada’s Im-
migration and Refugee Board. Mother and daughter re-
main separated, while UNHCR and Canadian government
officials grapple with the case.
Case Study No. 4
The United States actively intercepts vessels in the Caribbean
if there is suspicion of illegal migration.11 It has entered into
more than twenty bilateral agreements granting the right to
board foreign flagged vessels for this purpose. The nation-
alities most often intercepted are Cubans, Haitians, Domini-
cans, Ecuadorians, and Chinese. Different standards of
screening apply to the different groups. Cubans, for exam-
ple, are normally given a screening on board the migrant
vessel or on board a U.S. Coast Guard vessel to determine
whether they have a “credible fear” of persecution, though
even those found to be refugees are not ultimately permitted
entry to the U.S., but are “resettled” in other countries in the
region. Chinese are given a written statement (in Mandarin
Chinese), which explains certain rights and a form to fill in.
Haitians reportedly need to meet the “shout test;” that is,
they must insist verbally that they wish to seek asylum. This
differential treatment raises serious questions about access
to protection and durable solutions for intercepted refugees.
State Practice
A defining prerogative of the nation-state is its right to
determine who may or may not enter and remain in its
territory.12 States employ various tools in their exercise of
this basic jurisdiction. First among these are visa policies,
which, for the purposes of this article, are not considered
interception measures per se, but which clearly limit the
ability of individuals to exercise the right to seek asylum. As
John  Morrison  and  Beth  Crosland have observed:  “The
imposition of visa restrictions on all countries that generate
refugees is the most explicit blocking mechanism for asylum
flows and it denies most refugees the opportunity for legal
migration.”13 Some background on visa policies is included
below, as visa regimes are the main reason why asylum
seekers and other migrants resort to the services of people
smugglers, use false documents, and otherwise find them-
selves in situations where they may be intercepted.
Visa Requirements
The right to enter the territory of a state is generally reserved
to nationals of that state.14 Non-nationals are often required
to obtain a visa to enter a foreign country. Visa policies allow
a state individually to assess each person seeking entry, and
permit wide discretion in admitting or refusing applicants.
Visa requirements rarely apply uniformly to all foreign
nationals,15 but instead reflect a state’s political, economic,
or historical ties. Industrialized countries frequently im-
pose visa requirements on countries that produce large
numbers of refugees, asylum seekers, or irregular migrants.
The introduction by Canada in December 2001 of visa
requirements for citizens of Hungary and Zimbabwe, for
example, was in direct response to the large number of
asylum seekers from those two countries.16
Visa requirements clearly have significant implications
for asylum seekers. In order to obtain a visa, an applicant
must present a valid passport, but a person who fears
persecution at the hands of his or her government is un-
likely to take the risk of approaching the authorities for a
travel document. As observed by a joint Council of
Europe/UNHCR Experts Roundtable, “Often it is impossi-
ble, or too dangerous, for a refugee to obtain the necessary
travel documents from the authorities.”17 In other cases,
where government institutions have collapsed due to civil
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war (e.g. Somalia), there is simply no agency to issue pass-
ports. Even when asylum seekers do have passports, they
may be unable to travel to an embassy to apply for a visa.
Moreover, as observed above, embassies and consulates are
unlikely provide a visa to an individual for the purpose of
seeking asylum.
Visa policy is increasingly being  harmonized region-
ally.18 As a result, not only individual countries but also
entire regions are becoming inaccessible to asylum seekers.
As noted by Human Rights Watch and other NGOs: “Des-
perate people will resort to desperate measures. With all
other options closed, migrants and asylum seekers have
been forced to make use of illegal and dangerous means of
entry via sophisticated trafficking and smuggling rings.”19
Responses to Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons
Smuggling and trafficking in persons are of growing concern
to the international community. Smuggling in persons has
been defined in the 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air as “the procurement, in order
to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material
benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of
which the person is not a national or a permanent resi-
dent.”20 Among those being smuggled are persons who are
on the move for a variety of reasons, including: individual
or group persecution; generalized violence; other human
rights violations; external aggression, occupation or foreign
domination; natural or economic disasters; extreme pov-
erty; striving for betterment; or a mixture of these motives.21
People smuggling is a business, and in principle involves
willing parties – the smuggler who seeks to make money,
and the person being smuggled who wants or needs transit.
The demand for the services of people smugglers is driven
by a combination of shrinking legal migration opportuni-
ties, especially for asylum seekers and poorer migrants from
the South, and expanding migration control activities, such
as interception.
Trafficking, on the other hand, has been defined in a
companion protocol, the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Sup-
press and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children:
“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transpor-
tation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduc-
tion, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a
position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of pay-
ments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
servitude or the removal of organs...22
Though often lumped together for discussion purposes,
it is important to recognize some of the significant differ-
ences between smuggling and trafficking in persons. Traf-
ficking in persons is inherently coercive and exploitative.
As the Protocol definition emphasizes, trafficking involves
the threat or use of force and the abuse of power over
vulnerable persons, and may even involve abduction. Peo-
ple are trafficked for the purposes of sexual or work exploi-
tation. Yet among those who are trafficked may well be
some who need international protection, whose vulnerabil-
ity to traffickers may originally have been a result of inse-
curity in their place of origin. Some of those who end up
being trafficked may have begun their journeys intending
to simply avail themselves of the assistance of smugglers.
Furthermore, having come under the control of traffickers,
trafficked persons should be recognized as presumptively
in need of protection from further exploitation.23
Smugglers and traffickers in persons frequently employ
the same means to transport people, such as fraudulent
travel documents or clandestine attempts to reach a state’s
territory by sea. States’ concerns about smuggling and traf-
ficking are motivated by a mixture of factors including
national security, sovereignty, and the “integrity” of immi-
gration programs, as well as concern about the safety and
human rights of those being smuggled and trafficked. How-
ever, as noted, most enforcement measures designed to
prevent illegal or unauthorized migration, such as the visa
controls described above, or the carrier sanctions and im-
migration control activities discussed below, have the un-
intended effect of encouraging the expansion of smuggling
and trafficking networks.
Carrier Sanctions
Visa requirements may discourage irregular migration but
they do not necessarily prevent persons without visas from
arriving at a port of entry and seeking admission. The pro-
hibition on refoulement of refugees24 contained in the 1951
Refugee Convention means in practice that a person who
arrives at the frontier of a state party and makes a refugee
claim must have the merits of that claim considered before
being removed, regardless of whether the individual holds a
valid visa. It should be noted that the non-refoulement prin-
ciple is not limited to states party  to the 1951 Refugee
Convention; non-refoulement has also evolved into a norm
of customary international law.25
In order to enforce visa requirements, many states im-
pose financial penalties on carriers that bring improperly
documented persons into their territory.26 Article 27 of the
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1990 Schengen Implementation Agreement, for example,
obliges all members of the EU to implement carrier sanc-
tions.27 This was followed in 2001 by a European Council
Directive28 to harmonize penalties against carriers trans-
porting  undocumented passengers. Canadian legislation
imposes steep penalties on transport companies that bring
improperly documented persons to Canada, including for
the costs of detention, return, and, in some cases, medical
care.29
Carriers, seeking to avoid such sanctions, are thus put
into the position of having to check travellers’ documents
before allowing them to board. Airline representatives and,
in some cases, private security companies hired by airlines
are trained to identify false or improper documentation
and to prevent the embarkation of persons without ade-
quate travel documents and visas.30 Governments and the
International Air Transport Association (IATA), which
represents the global airline industry, have provided train-
ing to carrier personnel on detection of fraudulent docu-
ments. As well, pursuant to the 1944 Chicago Convention,31
many airlines have negotiated memoranda of under-
standing with states, which waive sanctions where airlines
can demonstrate strict good-faith adherence to document
control procedures. In some cases sanctions may also be
waived where the improperly documented passenger is
subsequently found to be a refugee.32
The transport industry is not necessarily happy about
having to undertake immigration control activities. IATA
indicates that its members see immigration control as a
matter that ought be left in the hands of states, which have
the expertise and jurisdiction to examine the credibility of
asylum claims and the obligation to protect refugees.33
With respect to activities at sea, the actions taken to avoid
fines have had even more dramatic results, for example,
when undocumented stowaways are discovered on board.
As Morrison and Crosland observe:
Unfortunately, in the case of commercial sea vessels such proac-
tive action by ship’s crews to avoid carrier fines is known to
sometimes have  fatal consequences. International Maritime
Organisation guidelines given to ships crew on the detection of
stowaways make no reference to the right to asylum or the
dangers of refoulement.34
Immigration Control Officers, Airline Liaison Officers,
and Migration Integrity Officers
In order to assist carriers in complying with carrier sanctions
legislation, some states deploy immigration control officers
(ICOs) to foreign transit hubs used by “improperly docu-
mented” persons en route to their territory. As a rule, these
officers provide training and expertise to carriers and offi-
cials of other countries in the identification of fraudulent
documents. Canadian government officials are careful to
emphasize that immigration control officers do not have
extraterritorial powers and act solely in an advisory capac-
ity.35 However, like airline personnel themselves, they do not
appear to have any mandate to examine the intercepted
person’s motivation for migration or to address any need for
international protection.
In a document tabled in the House of Commons in
November 2002, Citizenship and Immigration Canada
(CIC) described the role of Canada’s ICOs as: “monitoring
airlines for MOU compliance and providing training, ex-
pert guidance and support to airline staff and local authori-
ties abroad in order to reduce irregular migration to
Canada.”36 The document goes on to emphasize the ICO
intelligence-gathering role, which it says is “essential to
efforts toward the development of a more proactive ‘intel-
ligence-led’ approach to combating global irregular migra-
tion.”37 Regarding the relationship between immigration
control officers and airlines, CIC asserts: “The focus of ICO
airport activities has been and should continue to be the
transfer of skills and information. The primary responsibil-
ity for passenger screening remains with the airlines.”38
Canada  currently has a large global network of such
officers,39 now called “Migration Integrity Officers”, who
work under the newly created Intelligence Branch of CIC.
Between 1996 and late 2002, Canada’s immigration control
personnel are reported to have interdicted “more than
40,000 people abroad attempting to travel to Canada with
improper documents.”40
Canada is not alone in its use of immigration control
officers. Australia, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands,
the UK, and the United States all post officials at their
consulates and embassies abroad to advise airlines and
other governments on fraudulent documents. The UK ex-
panded its airline liaison officer presence fourfold in 1999,
putting officers in twenty international airports.41
The impact of airport interceptions on refugee protec-
tion is difficult to quantify. As noted, immigration control
officers and airline liaison officers are not mandated to
examine the reasons for an intercepted person’s attempt to
enter the country of prospective destination. A senior Ca-
nadian official has indicated that Canadian practice is to
refer intercepted asylum seekers to the local UNHCR office,
in those cases where the interception has taken place in a
state that is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention.42
However, there  is  no  data available to  corroborate this
assertion. There is no information, for example, about how
many of the 40,000 “improperly documented” travellers
reportedly intercepted by or with the assistance of Cana-
dian immigration control officers were given an opportu-
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nity to indicate their need for asylum, if any,  or what
procedures were followed. There is no information on how
many were referred to UNHCR, how many were referred
to local asylum authorities, how many were simply turned
back, or what happened to them.
As the Council of Europe/UNHCR Experts Roundtable
observed in relation to EU interception practices:
It is impossible to be precise about the number of refugees who
are denied escape due to stringent checks by transport compa-
nies. The number is considered to be on the rise, however, not
least since transport companies have been assisted by Govern-
mental liaison officers in verifying travel documents.43
Interception to Avoid “Asylum Overload”
The deployment of airline liaison officers or immigration
control officers to advise carriers on detecting fraudulent
documents is not the only focus of interception measures
employed by states at foreign airports. In mid-2001, the UK
began to intercept individuals abroad because of the expec-
tation that they would apply for asylum in the UK, even
though they possessed valid documentation for entry. Such
actions go beyond UNHCR’s suggested definition of inter-
ception, which is limited to stopping the movement of
persons “without the required documentation.”
The action in question concerns measures implemented
by the UK at Prague airport, in which Czech citizens of
Roma origin who were intending to travel to London were
intercepted prior to boarding. By 2000, the UK government
had grown increasingly concerned about the number of
Czech Roma asylum seekers arriving in the UK. Although
authoritative statistics are not available, according to UK
Home Office information, the majority of these applica-
tions were unfounded – notwithstanding the fact that the
Home Office recognized that discrimination, harassment,
and even persecution of Roma citizens did occur in the
Czech Republic.44
The UK therefore proceeded to conclude an arrange-
ment with the Czech authorities allowing the UK to set up
a pre-entry clearance procedure at the Prague airport. As
Czech citizens were not required to obtain a UK visa for
travel to the UK, the travellers were stopped on alleged
grounds that they were not genuinely seeking entry for the
limited period allowed for visitors and business travellers.
Although the UK has maintained that the pre-clearance was
not discriminatory, it appears that most of those stopped
were Roma. According to testimony before the UK High
Court by the European Roma Rights Centre, during the
period July 2001 through April 2002, “of 6170 passengers
who were Czech nationals but not Roma, only 14 [or fewer
than 1 per cent] were refused entry, while of 78 who were
apparently Roma, 68 [or 90 per cent] were refused.”45
The UK actions in Prague raise questions not only about
the discriminatory effect of the pre-clearance practice, but
also about the restriction of the individual right to seek
asylum. A legal challenge of the UK’s pre-screening practice
was unsuccessful at first instance and in the Court of Ap-
peal, where the UNHCR filed an amicus curiae brief46 argu-
ing that the UK practice was not compatible with the
principle of good faith in the implementation of interna-
tional law. The case has been further appealed to the House
of Lords by the NGO Liberty.
Maritime Interception
The most widely publicized and most visible type of inter-
ception is that conducted at sea (often also referred to as
“interdiction”). The best-known actions are those of the
U.S. Coast Guard in the Caribbean and of the Australian
navy in waters separating Australia from Indonesia. But
other countries, including Greece, Italy, Malaysia, Spain,
Turkey, and Yemen, also intercept vessels suspected of car-
rying improperly documented migrants or asylum seekers,
whether in the territorial sea, in contiguous waters,47 or on
the high seas, in international waters. While Canada does
not engage directly in maritime interception on its own, it
has been involved in joint interception activities with other
states.48
Analogous to the interception of improperly docu-
mented travellers at foreign airports, countries generally try
to intercept boats while they are still in international waters,
to prevent them from entering territorial waters or reaching
shore. Interception is sometimes done in the context of
anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling operations.49
In most instances, the aim after interception is the return
without delay of all migrants to their country of origin.
Passengers are rarely disembarked on the territory of the
intercepting state. When they are not returned directly to
the country of embarkation, whether this is their country
of origin or one through which they transited, they may be
taken to a third country which agrees to their disembarka-
tion.50
An area of considerable complexity is rescue at sea. States
have an obligation under international maritime law to
rescue those on unseaworthy vessels.51 But when such ves-
sels are carrying irregular migrants and the seaworthiness
of the vessel is open to judgment, activities that are charac-
terized as “rescue” may in fact be designed primarily to
intercept and prevent entry into territorial waters. Even
where an act is clearly one of rescue, required by interna-




In terms of numbers, the U.S. would appear to be the
leader in maritime interception. From 1982 through 2002,
the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted 185,801 people at sea.53
Most were from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, or Cuba,
though Ecuadorians, Chinese, and others have also been
intercepted.54
The US Committee for Refugees reports that: “Inter-
dicted migrants were not entitled to any asylum screening,
regardless of whether they were interdicted in international
waters or US territorial waters. The INS does, however,
provide a minimal level of asylum screening to interdicted
persons on an ad hoc basis and slightly more screening to
Chinese and Cubans” than to others.55 Any Haitians or
other migrants who manage to evade the Coast Guard and
arrive on U.S. territory by sea are subjected to “expedited
removal” proceedings. These proceedings include manda-
tory, indefinite detention, without possibility of bail, and
little opportunity to make an asylum claim.56 (Cuban na-
tionals, however, are exempted from the expedited removal
procedure.)
Australia also engages in maritime interception. Since
the Tampa incident, highlighted in Case Study No. 2, Aus-
tralia has instituted a number of measures. One of the first
was “excision” of certain of its territory from its “migration
zone.” This legal fiction was designed to remove the pro-
tection of Australia’s immigration and asylum laws from
unauthorized arrivals to those territories which were most
easily and frequently accessed by migrant ships (e.g. Christ-
mas Island and Ashmore Reef).57
The next was to build on the Nauru experience and start
negotiating similar arrangements with other states in the
region. In October 2001, Australia announced that Papua
New Guinea would build a refugee-processing centre for
intercepted Australia-bound asylum seekers, in exchange
for an initial aid package of US$500,000. Nauru and Papua
New Guinea became part of Australia’s “Pacific Solution”
to “irregular migration.”
Under the policy, Australia intercepts ships on the high
seas believed to be headed toward their territory and diverts
the passengers who claim asylum to one of the third states
with which Australia has entered into a contract for the
reception of asylum seekers. Such states need not them-
selves be parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention – and to
date none has been. With the exception of the passengers
on the Tampa, whose claims the UNHCR agreed to assess,
examination of asylum claims is done by Australian
authorities. Asylum seekers who somehow do manage to
enter Australian territory and claim asylum there, including
children, are mandatorily detained, often in remote loca-
tions and under difficult conditions.58
Many of the refugee protection and human rights issues
raised by maritime interception are the same as those raised
by interception at airports: namely, the right to seek and
enjoy asylum, and non-refoulement. In addition, there are
important questions that need to be considered regarding
the safety of those who are intercepted and the widespread
use of lengthy detention in poor conditions.
Regional Agreements
There is a growing trend towards regional and international
harmonization and co-operation on migration control, in-
cluding not just visa and carrier liability policy, but also
interception and enforcement programs.
The G8’s ad hoc Migration Experts working group, for
example, finalized in October 2002 a set of “Best Practices
for Document and Passenger Screening and Related Work
at Airports.”59 The Inter-governmental Consultations on
Asylum, Refugees and Migration Policies in Europe, North
America and Australia (IGC) held a workshop on intercep-
tion for its members in late 2002.60 Co-operative strategies
for interception have likewise been under intense discus-
sion at the Regional Conference on Migration (the Puebla
Process), of which Canada and the U.S., as well as Mexico
and the Central American states, are members; in the Bu-
dapest Process of European states; and at the wider Bali
Conference of thirty-three states, which is focused specifi-
cally on enforcing migration control. There are numerous
other such regional groupings: for instance, the Manila
Process; the Asia-Pacific Consultation; and the “5+5”
Group of Western Mediterranean states, to cite just a few.
These fora are all state-driven and conduct their meet-
ings largely behind closed doors. Civil society groups are
generally not represented. Although the intergovernmental
organizations mandated to oversee the protection of refu-
gees and human rights are at times invited – as in the Puebla
group – they generally participate only as observers.
Summary of Refugee Protection Concerns
The preceding discussion has highlighted a number of areas
where migration control and refugee protection imperatives
come into conflict. For instance:
• Visa policies rarely accommodate the special situation of
asylum seekers and thus either prevent escape or leave
persons little choice but to resort to the services of people
smugglers and traffickers;
• Carrier sanctions serve to enforce visa regimes, but put the
task of screening passengers’ documents into the hands of
private agents who are neither mandated nor trained to
identify asylum seekers and refugees;
• Immigration control officers assist carriers in complying
with carrier liability legislation, helping to distinguish be-
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tween genuine and fraudulent documents; they do not have
a refugee protection mandate;
• Interception measures may restrict the right to seek and
enjoy asylum from persecution;
• Maritime interception, like interception at airports, fre-
quently lacks any mechanism to distinguish refugees from
non-refugees, resulting in summary returns of those inter-
cepted; moreover, where persons intercepted at sea are
provided with an opportunity to claim asylum, this is often
ad hoc and inconsistent;
• Interception frequently results in arbitrary detention,
sometimes under conditions below minimum standards;
• Interception measures by individual states lack transpar-
ency; moreover, there is growing state co-operation on
migration control without adequate involvement of civil
society organizations or of the UNHCR.
At heart, all of these concerns flow from the basic obser-
vation that interception measures as currently imple-
mented,  whether at sea  or  on  land,  consistently fail to
distinguish between persons who need international pro-
tection and those who do not, and thus do not provide
refugees with the protection  to which they are  entitled
under international law. One of the reasons for this failure
is the premise of many states that they are not constrained
by their domestic laws or even by international law, so long
as the interception activities are conducted beyond their
own borders. Similarly, when interception is conducted by
private agents, such as carriers, states sometimes argue that
they are not responsible.
International Law
What are the international legal obligations of states in the
context of interception? That states have a sovereign right to
control access to their territory is evident. But are there any
limits on how they do so? One obvious restriction arises
from international refugee law, namely, the principle of
non-refoulement. States parties to the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion are prohibited, under Article 33.1, from returning in-
dividuals to persecution. That this applies to refugees and
asylum seekers at ports of entry, as well as those who claim
asylum from within the territory of a state party, is not
generally disputed. But what application does this principle
have to activities undertaken by states beyond their own
territory? And what is the relevance of other international
human rights and refugee law norms, in relation to extrater-
ritorial interception?
Extraterritoriality
It is sometimes argued that interception, which by definition
takes place outside the territory of the intercepting state,
does not engage the international human rights and refugee
law responsibilities of intercepting states, including the pro-
hibition on refoulement.61 Further, some states seem to take
the position that as long as the interception is done by a third
party, whether a transport company staff person or the crew
of a privately owned ship that has been instructed to rescue
passengers on a ship in distress, states are not responsible.62
However, neither the general law of state responsibility nor
international refugee and human rights law supports these
arguments.
The International Law Commission’s Articles on Re-
sponsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,63
adopted with consensus on “virtually all points”64 in 2001,
were developed over the course of some thirty years of
research, drafting, and debate by the world’s leading inter-
national jurists. The Articles do not attempt to propose new
law but rather to codify existing norms. As such, they
represent the highest authority for attributing responsibil-
ity to states.
Article 1 provides that: “Every internationally wrongful
act of a State entails the international responsibility of that
State.” Article 2 proceeds to lay out the conditions for such
a wrongful act, namely, “when conduct consisting of an act
or omission (a) is attributable to the State under interna-
tional law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international
obligation of the State.”
With respect to attribution of conduct to a state, three
articles are relevant to the interception context:
Article 4(1): The conduct of any State organ shall be considered
an act of that State under international law, whether the organ
exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions,
whatever the position it holds in the organization of the State,
and whatever its character as an organ of the central govern-
ment or of a territorial unit of the State.
Article 5: The conduct of a person or entity which is not an
organ of the State under article 4 but which is empowered by
the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental
authority shall be considered an act of the State under interna-
tional law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capac-
ity in the particular instance.
Article 8: The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be
considered an act of a State under international law if the person
or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or
under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the
conduct.
With regard to extraterritorial application of interna-
tional law, the Articles clearly provide that state responsi-
bility attaches to any internationally wrongful act that is
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properly attributable to the state. The place where such an
act occurs is simply not a relevant consideration. As Sir
Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem observe with re-
spect to the extraterritorial application of the 1951 Refugee
Convention:
The responsibility of the Contracting State for its own conduct
and that of those acting under its umbrella is not limited to
conduct occurring within its territory. Such responsibility will
ultimately hinge on whether the relevant conduct can be attrib-
uted to that State and not whether it occurs within the territory
of the State or outside it.65
In support of this proposition the authors cite a range of
human  rights treaties and  case  law from  the  European
Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Com-
mittee.66
The fact that it is airline staff who are checking docu-
ments and denying passage does not absolve states of re-
sponsibility, as the airline is simply acting on the basis of
carrier liability legislation imposed by the state, or even, in
some  cases, direct advice  from  an Immigration Liaison
Officer. Nor can a state deny responsibility for persons who
have been brought aboard a private ship if the master of that
ship was acting on instructions from the state in question.67
The Articles on State Responsibility do not allow for such
distinctions between a state organ and a person, group, or
entity acting for, or under the direction or control of, the
state. Indeed, in the Commentary on Article 5, UN special
rapporteur James Crawford explicitly includes in the ambit
of the article the situation where “Private or state-owned
airlines may have delegated to them certain powers in
relation to immigration control or quarantine.”68
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem make a similar point specifi-
cally with regard to the principle of non-refoulement:
[P]ersons will come within the jurisdiction of a State in circum-
stances in which they can be said to be under the effective
control of that State or are affected by those acting on behalf of
the State more generally, wherever this occurs. It follows that
the principle of non-refoulement will apply to the conduct of
State officials or those acting on behalf of the State wherever this
occurs, whether beyond the national territory of the State in
question, at border posts or other points of entry, in interna-
tional zones, at transit points, etc. [emphasis added]69
In summary, at international law, no distinction is made
for actions taken outside of state territory, nor for actions
taken by those acting for or under the direction or control
of the state when it comes to attribution of responsibility.
While the law is clear on this point, it is worth observing
that, from a human rights perspective, to hold otherwise
would be to render the international refugee protection
regime ineffective. States would be able to avoid their inter-
national obligations, creating a human rights vacuum for
intercepted refugees and asylum seekers.
International Maritime Law
State responsibility and sovereignty issues are even more
complicated in the maritime context, where in addition to
general international law norms of state responsibility there
is a well-established Law of the Sea. States have the right
under international maritime law to assert jurisdiction in
relation to migration not just in their territorial seas but also
in the “contiguous zone” between the territorial sea and the
high seas.70 While interception on the high seas without
authorization of the flag state would appear to be a prima
facie violation of the principle of free navigation of interna-
tional waters under the Law of the Sea,71 there is a counter-
vailing emerging obligation to intercept in order to combat
certain types of crime, including smuggling and trafficking
in persons.72 Similarly, as noted above, states are obliged to
go to the aid of ships in distress regardless of where they are.73
Both the anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking provisions
and the general obligation of rescue are tightly bound up
with maritime interception practices. Often those who are
travelling “irregularly” by sea are victims of smugglers and
traffickers, and their vessels are frequently unseaworthy.
Even where smugglers or traffickers are not involved, un-
seaworthy vessels appear to be the norm. At the same time,
however, “rescue” is easily used by an intercepting state as
a way around the normal obligation to seek the permission
of a flag state before intercepting and boarding a vessel on
the high seas or even in another state’s territorial sea or
contiguous zone.
From the perspective of refugee protection, the key ques-
tion in maritime interception is, what happens to inter-
cepted asylum seekers? Whatever the legality of the initial
interception and boarding of a vessel, the act of so doing is
a de facto exercise of jurisdiction over those on board the
ship. This exercise of jurisdiction, whether motivated by
rescue, anti-trafficking, or anti-smuggling criminal law en-
forcement, or migration control, brings with it the range of
responsibilities all states have at international law. It is
clearly within the scope of Articles 4 or 5 on State Respon-
sibility and so triggers international refugee and human
rights law obligations for the state. Whether on land or at
sea, the extension of state enforcement mechanisms beyond
state territory carries with it an obligation to ensure inter-
national protection for those who require it,74 and must be
exercised within the parameters of international law.
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The Right to Seek and Enjoy Asylum
Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own. This basic human right was recognized by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in Article 13 (2) of the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and is
included in a number of human rights treaties, notably the
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).75
The right of every person to seek and enjoy asylum
likewise is enshrined in the 1948 UDHR, in Article 14(1).
Both the 1948  American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties  of  Man and the  1969  American  Convention on
Human Rights include the right to asylum as well.76 The UN
General Assembly reaffirmed its commitment to this right
in a resolution in 2000, and “[called] upon all States to
refrain from taking measures that jeopardize the institution
of asylum.”77 Interception measures that preclude exercise
of the right to seek and enjoy asylum by preventing travel
to a state party to the 1951 Refugee Convention would
appear to be in violation of these key provisions.
Notwithstanding the clear language of these instru-
ments, however, the 1951 Refugee Convention itself does
not include a right to asylum but focuses instead on the
non-refoulement obligation that attaches to states. States
parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention have a good-faith
obligation to refrain from actions that run contrary to the
principles and objectives of this instrument.78 This would
include actions that directly or indirectly undermine the
very institution of asylum.
UNHCR, in its intervention before  the UK Court of
Appeal in the case of European Roma Rights Centre and
Others v. The Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, argued
that the UK’s pre-entry clearance procedure was not com-
patible with the UK’s general obligation to implement its
international obligations in good faith – and specifically, its
obligations as a state party to the 1951 Refugee Convention.79
Moreover, as Andrew Shacknove has argued,
Although no right to receive asylum yet exists in international,
regional or municipal law … a willingness to provide asylum is
the litmus test for the commitment by affluent states to human
rights.Affluentstatescannotexpectother,morevulnerablenations
to execute demanding reforms or improve human rights condi-
tions and at the same time claim that it is beyond their own
substantial means to sustain a commitment to asylum.”80
Non-refoulement
Underpinning  the  right  to  seek  and enjoy asylum  from
persecution is the fundamental state obligation of non-re-
foulement. This principle prohibits states and their agents
from returning, directly or indirectly, any person “in any
manner whatsoever” to a territory where they may be sub-
jected to persecution or torture.81 The prohibition applies
irrespective of whether such persons have been formally
recognized as refugees.82 It is explicitly included in the 1951
Refugee Convention,83 the 1984 Convention Against Tor-
ture (CAT),84 and several regional treaties.85 The UN Human
Rights Committee has found that the principle of non-re-
foulement is also a  component  of  Article  7  of  the 1966
ICCPR.86 Unlike the right to asylum, the non-refoulement
obligation is binding on parties to these treaties at interna-
tional law. Non-refoulement is also recognized as a principle
of customary international law87 and is progressively evolv-
ing into a peremptory norm of international law.88
The principle of non-refoulement does not include any
explicit geographical limitation,89 nor is it limited in appli-
cation to the actions of official state representatives. And
while Article 33.2 of the 1951 Refugee Convention provides
an exception to the non-refoulement principle where there
are serious security or criminality issues and the individual
poses a danger to security or to the community, Article 3 of
the 1984 CAT allows no such derogation where there is a
substantial risk of torture on return.
The direct removal of a refugee or an asylum seeker to a
country where he or she fears persecution is not the only
manifestation of refoulement. The removal of a refugee or
asylum seeker from one country to another that will sub-
sequently send the refugee onward to the place of feared
persecution constitutes indirect refoulement, for which sev-
eral countries may bear joint responsibility.90
In the context of interception, the principle of non-re-
foulement comes into play as soon as a state intercepts (and
thereby assumes some degree of jurisdiction over) a person
or group of persons. In order to comply with the non-re-
foulement obligation, prior to removing the person to his
or her country of origin, the state must satisfy itself that the
intercepted person will not face persecution on a ground
enumerated in the 1951 Refugee Convention, or torture,
upon return.91 To deny an asylum seeker access to fair and
effective procedures for the determination of his or her
refugee claim could result in refoulement,92 in violation of
international law.
Despite the absence of any explicit territorial limitation
in the 1951 Refugee Convention, it has been argued that the
non-refoulement principle in the 1951 Refugee Convention
does not have extraterritorial effect. In Sale v. Haitian Cen-
ters Council, Inc.93 the U.S. government argued, and the
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court accepted, that the term
refoulement only applies to expulsion from a state’s terri-
tory, and does not cover the situation where a person is
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seized outside of the territory and returned to his or her
country of origin.
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Sale  v. Haitian
Centers Council, Inc. has been subjected to widespread criti-
cism from the human rights and refugee law community
for upholding an incorrect interpretation of Article 33. Guy
Goodwin-Gill has argued vigorously that the Court incor-
rectly narrowed the true scope of the provision, asserting
that the provision unambiguously does have extraterrito-
rial effect.94 UNHCR itself, whose mandate it is to supervise
the application of the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention,95 took the same position in its amicus curiae brief
submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court.96 Considering the
same issues and facts, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights found that Article 33 had no geographical
limitations and accordingly applied on the high seas.97
The application of the provision to the interception con-
text was also directly asserted by participants in an experts’
roundtable on the principle of non-refoulement, organized
in 2001 in the context of UNHCR’s Global Consultations
on International Protection:
The principle of non-refoulement embodied in Article 33 en-
compasses any measure attributable to the State which could
have the effect of returning an asylum-seeker or refugee to the
frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be
threatened, or where he or she is at risk of persecution, includ-
ing interception, rejection at the frontier or indirect refoule-
ment.98
Finally, it is worth noting that both the 2000 Protocol
against the Smuggling of Migrants, and the 2000 Protocol
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
though not yet in force, include a “saving clause” which
explicitly requires that measures taken pursuant to the
protocols conform with the principle of non-refoulement
under Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention.99
In practical terms, then, the principle of non-refoulement
implies a positive obligation on states that intercept “ir-
regular migrants” to provide them with an opportunity to
claim asylum and to assess their claim fairly and effectively
prior to returning them.100 Those who establish that they
are refugees in the sense of the 1951 Refugee Convention or
who would face torture if they were returned must  be
protected from return.  While the intercepting  state,  by
virtue of having exercised jurisdiction over the refugee, has
primary responsibility for the protection of the intercepted
refugee, it need not necessarily be the one to provide long-
term asylum; the 1951 Refugee Convention contemplates
the possibility of inter-state responsibility sharing.101
Non-discrimination
The principle of non-discrimination is well established at
international human rights and refugee law. It is guaranteed
in Article 2 of the 1948 UDHR,102 Article 2(1) of the 1966
ICCPR,103 and Article 2(2) of the 1966 International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).104
It is also, of course, the motivating principle of the 1969
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (CERD).105
The principle of non-discrimination is included in the
1951 Refugee Convention itself. Article 3 provides: “The
Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Con-
vention to refugees without discrimination as to race, relig-
ion or country of origin.”
The common saving clauses of the 2000 Smuggling and
Trafficking Protocols apply these principles of interna-
tional law directly to the interception context:
The measures set forth in this Protocol shall be interpreted and
applied in a way that is not discriminatory to persons on the
ground that they are victims of trafficking in persons. The
interpretation and application of those measures shall be con-
sistent with internationally recognized principles of non-dis-
crimination.106
Whatever the provisions of the domestic laws of inter-
cepting states, it is clear that at international law, intercep-
tion measures may not target particular groups or
individuals on the basis of race, religion, sex, ethnicity,
political opinion, nationality, country of origin or physical
incapacity.107 Prima facie, the maritime interception prac-
tices of the U.S. and the airport interceptions of the UK
violate this fundamental principle.
Mobility rights
The right to leave a country is guaranteed by Article 13(2)
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 12 of
the 1966 ICCPR likewise guarantees the freedom to leave any
country,108 and emphasizes the importance of this right by
expressly limiting the circumstances in which this right can
be restricted, namely, only where the restrictions “are pro-
vided by law, are necessary to protect national security,
public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the
other rights recognized in the present Covenant.” Article
22(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights makes
similar provision.
The UN Human Rights Committee had occasion to
discuss the application of this right in the context of inter-
ception in its Concluding Observations on Austria. There
the Committee expressed concern that Austria’s regime of
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carrier sanctions and other “pre-frontier arrangements”
may violate Article 12(2).109 Likewise during its considera-
tion of France, the Committee observed:
The Committee is furthermore concerned at the reported in-
stances of asylum seekers not being allowed to disembark from
ships at French ports, without being given an opportunity to
assert their individual claims; such practices raise issues of
compatibility with article 12, paragraph 2, of the Covenant.110
Absent compelling reasons of national security or other
applicable grounds cited in Article 12(3), interception
measures that result in the return of the person to their
country of origin appear to be inconsistent with the Article
12(2) obligations of states parties to the ICCPR. This ap-
plies not solely with respect to asylum seekers and refugees,
but rather to all persons.
Further, in General Comment 27, the Human Rights
Committee asserted that the freedom to leave the territory
of a state includes the right to choose the state of destina-
tion. This freedom also applies to “an alien being legally
expelled from the country…(subject to the agreement of
the state).”111 While the General Comment does not directly
contemplate the circumstances of interception, there is a
clear analogy where it is established that the state is exerting
jurisdiction over the intercepted person’s movement. In
such circumstances, while Article 12(2) does not explicitly
require  the intercepting state to  allow entry  to  its own
territory, it does require that the intercepted person be
allowed to choose her or his state of destination. Especially
where important rights such as life or freedom from torture
are concerned, individuals must be allowed to choose an
alternate state of destination where the rights will be re-
spected.112 To the extent that intercepted persons are denied
an opportunity to choose an alternate destination, inter-
ception thus violates the right to leave one’s country.
Family Unity and Children’s Rights
Another area of international law that is directly relevant to
interception is that of child protection and protection of the
family. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child
requires that, “In all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bod-
ies, the best interest of the child shall be a primary consid-
eration.” States parties must: “ensure the child such
protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being,
taking into account the rights and duties of his or her
parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally respon-
sible for him or her,” and, to this end, must “take all appro-
priate legislative and administrative measures.”113
In addition, Article 16(3) of the 1948 UDHR sets out the
entitlement of the family to protection “by society and the
state.” Similarly, Article 10(1) of the 1966 ICESCR pro-
vides: “The widest possible protection and assistance
should  be  accorded to the family ... particularly for its
establishment and while it is responsible for the care and
education of dependent children.” Article 23 of the 1966
ICCPR reiterates: “The family is the natural and fundamen-
tal group unit of society and is entitled to protection by
society and the State.”
In the context of interception, these provisions would
require that, before making a final decision regarding ad-
mission or return, the best interest of any child involved be
given due consideration. This would apply not only where
an unaccompanied child is intercepted, but also when a
parent is intercepted en route to be reunited with her or his
child or children. Current interception practices appear to
fail to address children’s interests to any degree.
Building Compliance
As noted, states have a legitimate interest in controlling
irregular migration. In addition, there is an emerging obli-
gation to intercept persons in order to combat certain types
of crime, including smuggling and trafficking in persons.114
However, the extension of state enforcement mechanisms
beyond state territory carries with it an obligation to ensure
international protection for those who require it.115
Yet existing migration control tools, including visa re-
quirements, carrier sanctions, and interception measures,
rarely incorporate safeguards for the protection of asylum
seekers and refugees.  UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection,
adopted by its Executive Committee in 2002, recognizes
this shortcoming and calls for “[b]etter identification of
and proper response to the needs of asylum seekers and
refugees, including access to protection within the broader
context of migration management.”116
If interception measures fail to distinguish between those
intercepted persons who require international protection
and those who do not, the ability of persons in need of
protection to reach safety and to have access to fair and
effective asylum procedures is jeopardized and intercepted
persons are at risk of refoulement.117 States have both a legal
and moral obligation to ensure that refugees and asylum
seekers may enjoy their human rights, including access to
protection.118 While interception practices present some
serious challenges to this basic objective, these challenges
are not insurmountable.
The 2003 UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion
Although interception is not a new phenomenon, it has only
recently been taken up qua interception by UNHCR’s Execu-
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tive Committee. In earlier years, the Committee had dealt
extensively with the matter of rescue  at sea.119 In 2000,
UNHCR put the topic on the agenda of its Standing Com-
mittee for the first time, and tabled a working paper entitled
“Interception of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: The Inter-
national Framework and Recommendations for a Compre-
hensive Approach.”120 In May 2001, UNHCR organized a
regional workshop in Ottawa on “Incorporating Refugee
Protection Safeguards into Interception Measures,”121 the
conclusions of which were presented to a meeting of the
Global Consultations on International Protection in June of
that year.122 In March 2002 UNHCR convened an Expert
Roundtable on Rescue at Sea,123 which addressed issues of
state responsibility and the international legal framework.
Finally, in October 2003, UNHCR’s Executive Committee
adopted a “Conclusion on Protection Safeguards in Inter-
ception Measures.”124
The Executive Committee Conclusion, though  it has
significant gaps and weaknesses, is nevertheless an impor-
tant milestone. It recognizes that states have an interest in
controlling irregular migration and that interception activi-
ties will therefore continue, but that this must not prevent
asylum seekers and refugees from gaining access to safety
and obtaining international protection. The Conclusion
recommends that interception measures be guided by eight
considerations to ensure “adequate treatment” of asylum
seekers and refugees among those intercepted. These con-
siderations can be summarized as follows:
1. allocation of state responsibility: primary responsi-
bility for addressing the protection needs of inter-
cepted persons lies with the state where interception
occurs;
2. humane treatment of intercepted persons in accord-
ance with their human rights;
3. the need to take into account the fundamental differ-
ence between asylum seekers and refugees, and other
migrants;
4. non-refoulement and access to international protec-
tion and durable solutions for those who need it;
5. the particular needs of women, children, and vulner-
able persons;
6. intercepted asylum seekers and refugees should not
be liable to criminal prosecution for the fact of hav-
ing been smuggled, nor punished for illegal entry or
presence (subject to Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee
Convention);
7. persons not in need of international protection
should be swiftly returned to their countries of ori-
gin;
8. state authorities and agents acting on behalf of the
state in implementing interception measures should
receive specialized training in human rights and
refugee protection.
The adoption of this Conclusion paves the way for
UNHCR to issue Guidelines on Refugee Protection Safe-
guards in Interception  Measures.  Such Guidelines have
been contemplated by UNHCR for some time, but a
number of states insisted that the Executive Committee first
adopt a Conclusion on the subject. The objective of Guide-
lines would presumably be to encourage states to maintain
access to asylum for those who need it, while allowing states
to control access to territory within the boundaries of in-
ternational law. By proposing specific safeguards for refu-
gee protection in the context of interception, UNHCR
Guidelines would contribute toward building consensus on
what is acceptable in the context of interception, and what
is not.
Future UNHCR Guidelines on Interception
Any future UNHCR Guidelines on interception will natu-
rally have to balance what is desirable against what is achiev-
able. However, as a framework for UNHCR Guidelines,
UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion 97 (LIV) 2003 is
not entirely satisfactory. In particular, it lacks reference to
the well-established international human rights principle of
non-discrimination, which would prohibit interception
measures from targeting particular groups or individuals on
the basis of race, religion, sex, ethnicity, political opinion,
nationality, country of origin, or physical incapacity.125
The Guidelines will also need to resolve the apparent
ambiguity in the Conclusion text, not to mention in the
practices of some states, with respect to state responsibility.
As discussed above, international law of state responsibility
does not allow states to absolve themselves of their interna-
tional legal obligations by undertaking interception meas-
ures extraterritorially. States must act within their legal
obligations regardless of where their actions take place. To
hold otherwise would be to eviscerate international human
rights and refugee law, as states would be able to set aside
their freely adopted legal obligations whenever it is conven-
ient to do so, simply by taking their actions outside of their
own territory.
The first “consideration” set out in UNHCR Executive
Committee Conclusion 97 (LIV) 2003, however, seems to
veer away from this fundamental principle. This provision
assigns primary responsibility for the protection of inter-
cepted persons not to the active, intercepting state, but
rather to the passive state within whose territory or territo-
rial waters the interception takes place. However, it is im-
portant to interpret this provision in the light of the rest of
the Conclusion and, more broadly, in the light of interna-
tional law. Two clauses are of particular relevance. One is
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the explicit acknowledgement in the Conclusion itself that
the text as a whole must be taken “without prejudice to
international law, particularly international human rights
and refugee law.” Though this acknowledgement is not
strictly necessary, since the Conclusion is itself “soft law”
and thus cannot derogate from treaty and customary law
obligations, it is nonetheless important in that it signals that
the states that negotiated the text recognized that intercep-
tion measures are indeed constrained by existing interna-
tional human rights and refugee law.
Also relevant to the question of state responsibility is the
second proposed “consideration”, which provides that
“[s]tate authorities and agents acting on behalf of the inter-
cepting state should take, consistent with their obligations
under international law, all appropriate steps in the imple-
mentation of interception measures to preserve and protect
the right to life…” (emphasis added). This is a further
acknowledgement that, notwithstanding the first enumerated
consideration, intercepting states themselves, as well as agents
acting on their behalf, are constrained by international law in
their implementation of interception measures.
Thus the assertion that “primary responsibility” lies with
the state within whose territory or territorial waters the
interception takes place cannot be used to absolve inter-
cepting states entirely of their international obligations. In
order to comply with international human rights and refu-
gee law, intercepting states, particularly if they are party to
the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol, must
ensure as a starting point that their interception activities
do not result in refoulement. Intercepted asylum seekers and
refugees must have access to a fair and effective refugee
status determination process, and if found to be in need of
protection they must receive it.
While the intercepting state is not necessarily obliged to
be the one that provides effective protection or a durable
solution, it cannot discharge its international obligations
without ensuring that those who are intercepted will receive
fair treatment and adequate protection at the hands of the
territorial state. The allocation of “primary” responsibility
to the territorial state via the UNHCR Executive Committee
Conclusion will thus relieve the intercepting state of its
protection obligations only if the territorial state will meet
the protection and durable solution needs of the inter-
cepted person. Where this condition is not met, the inter-
cepting state retains an underlying obligation to protect
those it intercepts.
UNHCR’s Guidelines will have to address this key issue
forcefully in order to put to rest any state’s lingering hopes
that the Conclusion would absolve them of any responsi-
bility for refugees and asylum seekers they intercept, or
those intercepted at their behest. The Guidelines should
clearly indicate that the proposed allocation of responsibil-
ity to the state where interception occurs will only be legally
valid and permissible if certain conditions are met, includ-
ing respect for and compliance with a number of funda-
mental safeguards, not all of which are explicitly outlined
in the Executive Committee Conclusion 97 (LIV) 2003.
Ultimately, however, it will be possible to build refugee
protection safeguards into interception measures only if
states are willing to be transparent about their interception
activities. Pursuant to Article 35 (2)126 of the 1951 Refugee
Convention, states and other entities involved in intercep-
tion activities should provide information to UNHCR with
respect to their interception practices in order to enable
UNHCR to fulfill its obligation to supervise the application
of the Convention. UNHCR’s work on the development of
Interception Guidelines may help to draw this practice out
of the shadows.
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